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INTRODUCTION 
 
A traveller (the author) arrives in a foreign city (Kampala, Uganda) for the first time 
and picks up a newspaper (Sunday Vision). The front-page banner headline reads 
‘Minister told to give bribe’. (Abbey, 2004) The story tells how a government 
minister in his private capacity as a motor dealer had successfully sued the 
government for compensation when it failed to purchase vehicles that it had 
contracted to buy from him. Leaving aside the issue of whether it is proper for a 
minister to act as a government contractor in this way, this is a classic corruption 
story. He alleges that after the judgement unnamed officials at the Ministry of Finance 
and Justice had told him that to obtain his money he must pay them 40% of the total 
sum. Then on page 5 of the newspaper the traveller finds an editorial lamenting the 
high incidence of bribery in the country and saying of those who doubted whether this 
was so ‘What do they know about corrupt policemen, unsavoury judges and crooked 
politicians? What do they know about lazy civil servants, zealous local government 
officials and marauding tax authorities?’ (Barenzi, 2004) Does the traveller infer from 
this that Uganda is an unusually corrupt country? No, he merely concludes that 
Uganda has an unusually outspoken press. Corruption is in fact universal, although 
particularly pervasive in developing countries. This paper will look at the way in 
which transparency can undermine some of the basis for corruption and speculate as 
to whether this provides a possible role for ICT applications. 
 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
Probably the most common way of describing corruption is to use terms that express 
loathing and contempt for the process and all those involved in it. Take for instance 
the words of the UK High Commissioner in Nairobi, Edward Clay, who said of 
Kenyan government ministers:  
 
Evidently the practitioners now in government have the arrogance, greed and 
perhaps a sense of panic to lead them to eat like gluttons. They may expect 
that we shall not see, or will forgive them, a bit of gluttony. But they can 
hardly expect us not to care when their gluttony causes them to vomit all over 
our shoes.’ (Clay, 2004)  
 
We will return to some of the implications of this accusation later, but it reflects a 
very common puritanical ethical stance on corruption that locates it in the fallible 
character of human beings. Natural though this may be, especially when one is faced 
with a demand for an illegal payment or faces the consequences of someone else’s 
corrupt manipulation of the system, it does not actually say very much that is helpful 
to anyone wishing to know what exactly is happening and why. 
 
In the 1960s one or two social scientists began to take a more dispassionate look at the 
operation of corruption in developing economies. A few examples will suffice to 
show the tendency of their line of argument. Leff (1964) suggested a view of bribery 
as a way in which entrepreneurs seek to break through restrictions imposed by a 
hostile or indifferent mode of governance. Leys (1965) recognising the high incidence 
of corruption in developing countries, also asked whether this might not be a response 
to the inappropriate and unresponsive state structures inherited from former colonial 
powers. He identified corruption as a cause for concern, but not for moralising. The 
concern arises from the way in which corruption can inhibit national development by 
removing wealth from the economy by those with offshore accounts; lower national 
morale; divert energy from productive economic activities and discourage outside 
investors, lenders and donors.  
 
Bayley (1966) elaborated this dispassionate approach somewhat further, introducing 
the notion that corruption was not necessarily a guarantee that development would be 
inhibited. After reviewing the harmful effects of corruption he constructed an 
argument for possible beneficial effects. This line of argument has never been 
fashionable, but it draws attention to the way in which corruption may encourage 
productive investment; offer a means by which excluded groups can gain access to 
economic opportunities; mitigate the rigidity of government planning; and break open 
the deadening influence of unresponsive bureaucracies. Although such lines of 
argument may seem distastefully amoral, they definitely have a value in encouraging 
us to understand corruption and its effects. Furthermore, the study of history offers 
lessons to be about the progress of societies that were deeply corrupted towards the 
elimination of most of the incidences of corruption.  
 
For instance, the political conflicts of seventeenth century England, the Civil War of 
1642-49, the Commonwealth and Protectorate of 1649 –1660 and the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 were, amongst many other things about subjecting the power of 
the state, as represented by the crown, to control in a wider public interest represented 
by parliament. The settlement achieved in 1688 laid firm institutional foundations that 
can be seen as the basis for modern British society. Political decisions had to be made 
with the consent of parliament. Revenue was raised by taxes granted by parliament 
and attached to agreed purposes. The independence of the judiciary was affirmed. 
After 1694 the Bank of England was created to handle the loan accounts of 
government and ensure the continuity of payments. Taken together these 
constitutional arrangements removed the arbitrariness of the exercise of power that 
was characteristic of the monarchical system and distributed access to power widely 
through the aristocratic, landed and wealth-owning classes. (North and Weingast, 
1989)  
 
The significant thing for our purposes is that it was not the case that rational, 
uncorrupted governance followed from these significant and highly influential 
changes. Far from it: for more than a century after 1688 England was an enormously 
successful society developing securely and swiftly in a host of complementary ways, 
but ruled through a system frequently referred to as ‘the old corruption’. Decisions 
were taken on the basis of complex and wide-reaching political alliances made 
possible by the corrupt distribution of access to sources of revenue, offices of profit, 
perquisites and privileges of many kinds. The system involved unfairness, injustice, 
waste, and sometimes national failures on a huge scale, but crucially it was open to 
enterprise, talent and energy and it delivered massive results in trade, agriculture, and 
manufacturing as well as culture and the arts. 
 
The comparatively narrow, oligarchic nature of the eighteenth century old corruption 
was unacceptable to thinkers of a democratic mind and in the nineteenth century it 
became widely accepted that a more rational, accountable system was needed by 
powerful nation with the most successful economy in the world. A strong concept of 
the public interest began to dominate political discourse and with surprising speed 
behaviour patterns that were acceptable in the old dispensation became anathema in 
the new. Doig (2003, p179) lists decisive aspects of the responses to this shift in 
public mentality as: 
 
Measures that precluded membership of parliament as a means of personal 
profit in return for government support; required verbal disclosure of financial 
interests; curbed payments for honours; disengaged MPs and ministers from 
the spoils and patronage systems that dominated traditional politics; 
introduced constraints on civil servants moving to the private sector; outlawed 
voter bribery, and introduced anti-corruption legislation for both public and 
private sectors. 
 
All of this and more was needed to create a society that throughout the twentieth 
century was mercifully free from most of the phenomena of corruption and which 
still, at the beginning of the twenty first century ranks very low in the international 
indices of corruption (Transparency International, 2003).  
 
The intention in outlining the progress of eliminating corruption in British life is not 
to argue some special virtue in British society: indeed it might be said that Britain 
moved away from corruption because it could afford to do so. It is also true that 
corruption persists and that Britain is a major exporter of corruption. British 
companies have several times been exposed as making enormous illegal payments to 
those with power and influence in countries with which trading links are sought. The 
oil and defence industries are the most frequently mentioned, but it is likely that 
payments of this type are a feature of international commercial transactions of all 
types, and no doubt executives of the companies concerned are willing to justify their 
conduct in terms of corporate and national benefit. 
 
The point in discussing the history of British corruption is that it shows a society 
functioning first through the agency of corruption and then moving towards a more 
open and fairer system. It offers evidence that this is possible and helps in the 
identification of mechanisms by which it can be achieved. What is missing from the 
account offered in the previous paragraphs is any real sense of the reasons why 
corruption is so justly detested, even if in some semi-abstract way it can be shown 
under certain circumstances to function to the overall benefit of national development. 
To do this it is necessary to draw attention to two aspects of the phenomenon of 
corruption as it actually operates in the developing countries.  
 
The first of these is the predator corruption of small and ruthless elites clustered 
around leaders, whether elected or holding power that they have seized illegally. This 
corruption has not only cheapened public life, but it has fostered an amoral business 
ethic to the detriment of commercial life. The enormous fortunes that have been 
acquired by leaders such as Mobuto in Zaire or Moi in Kenya are probably not so 
different in scale from that amassed by the man who was effectively the first British 
prime minister, de facto ruler of the country between 1721 and 1742, and complete 
exemplar of the old corruption, Sir Robert Walpole. The chief difference is the way in 
which wealth has been taken out of the country that was in the care of these modern 
rulers by their own family, friends and political and business associates, to be placed 
in overseas bank accounts, property and other investments. The predator corruption of 
leaders has not merely effectively robbed countless individuals, in the way that 
eighteenth century British corruption did, but also impoverished the national economy 
as a whole by extracting wealth from it to the benefit of Swiss bankers and the 
economies of booming importers of capital in the Middle East and South East Asia. In 
contrast, the eighteenth century predation of the old corruption recycled the money 
into the national economy. Predator corruption is what Edward Clay was attacking in 
the speech quoted above and it is virtually impossible for anyone outside the corrupt 
circle not to share the disgust he expresses.  
 
The second is the incidence of petty corruption of those, including the police, the 
judiciary, government and local government officials, and health care workers, who 
are responsible for the delivery of public services. The need to make payments to 
officials to obtain services diverts the provision of those services towards those who 
are able to find the means to pay, and away from those who cannot. It is present in 
such a completely consistent way that it sometimes needs journalists and other 
commentators to remind people that it should not be taken for granted (as with the 
quotation in the introduction to this paper). It expresses itself in many ways such as 
the practice of charging the public for essential official forms that are supposed to be 
freely available. At the same time, it provides a much needed supplement to the 
incomes of underpaid and neglected work forces and so prevents the utter collapse of 
overstretched public services. In this sense it is a form of the ‘beneficial’ corruption 
identified by the economists quoted earlier. It may well take the form of a standard 
and wholly predictable tariff, or it may be unpredictable and arbitrary, but the most 
consistent feature is its presence in the lives of everyone in the community. To those 
members of society with comfortable incomes it may be no more than an annoyance 
or inconvenience, but to the mass of the population it constitutes an illegal tax for 
which they must try to budget, and which will consume a substantial part of their 
income each year. This is the reason why it cannot be tolerated and why the 
elimination of corruption is part of democratic political programmes and a major 
feature of civil society campaigning throughout the world. 
 
 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
Uncorrupted politicians and civil society campaigning bodies propose a variety of 
approaches to the problem of corruption. Institutional reform, powerful legal 
sanctions, and the creation of regulatory bodies are amongst the types of approach that 
appear in anti-corruption programmes. Alongside them, or forming part of them, it 
tends to be an almost universal proposal that greater transparency should be 
introduced into systems that have too many areas of ignorance and concealment in 
which corruption can flourish. The reason why transparency is so consistently 
advocated that it offers both knowledge of how a corruption-free system should 
operate and what it should offer, and the capacity to find out about the day-to-day 
operation of governance and the manipulation of it that is practised by the corrupt. In 
some ways the faith in transparency is naïve. By itself transparency achieves nothing, 
or very little. What it offers is a basis for effective action based on knowledge and 
understanding. This makes it a genuinely indispensable feature of any anti-corruption 
programme and worthy of some detailed explanation. 
 
Transparency is a term that is comparatively little used by the information professions 
themselves and yet it encapsulates a great deal of the rationale behind the provision of 
good information systems, be they libraries, archives, databases, or reporting and 
monitoring systems. The term is used in conjunction with a range of related and 
complementary terms such as scrutiny, accountability, audit, disclosure, and it has 
considerable elements in common with freedom of access to information. Statements 
on transparency frequently start by citing the same Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights that can be seen as the basic rationale behind the 
activities of the information professions. 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. 
 
This same formulation is vital for a range of human rights NGOs; it underpins the 
work of investigative journalists and broadcasters; writers and publishers associations 
justify the work of their members in its light; and it also has implications for the 
accountants and economic regulators who seek to induce the business world to 
operate in a climate of financial transparency. What transparency (and Article 19) 
means in terms of a establishing a polity in which corruption will not thrive tends to 
take a number of specific forms. The following will be briefly outlined here as an 
introduction to some of the main elements of public transparency: 
 
• Open government and public scrutiny; 
• Freedom of information laws; 
• Protection of public interest disclosure; 
• Financial accountability and auditing; 
• Investigative journalism; 
• Civil sector campaigning. 
 
Probably the best starting point is the concept of open government and public 
scrutiny. It is rooted in an elected legislature, distinct from the executive arm and 
supported by an independent and impartial judiciary. Parliamentary scrutiny of the 
executive through the opportunity to question and debate the decisions of ministers in 
the legislative chamber, and a system of non-partisan specialist review committees are 
essential. However, open government goes much further than this. In a system of open 
government the meetings of not merely the legislature, but the committees that work 
of specific issues are open to the public. Government financial accounting is full and 
promptly delivered. Planning documentations, and minutes of decisions are all open 
to public inspection and consultative forums are called as a matter of course whenever 
appropriate. A system of ombudsmen permits the citizen to follow up cases of 
maladministration. The same systems and standards are also applied to the workings 
of local government, and privatised government agencies. Taken together, these can 
be seen as aspects of a total national integrity system. (Pope, 2000) Yet open 
government, as can be seen from this, is much more a culture than it is a system. It 
calls for politicians and officials who will accept the disciplines that it requires rather 
than seeking to evade or delay. It also relates very closely to other sources of 
transparency. 
 
Arguably, the cornerstone of open government is freedom of information legislation. 
In Sweden there has been a law in force since 1766 granting free access to all official 
documentation. These rights go far beyond what is offered by the freedom of 
information legislation of most other countries. In fact the European Commission 
recently accused Sweden of infringements of Community Law because Commission 
documents regarded as confidential were released to enquirers under their law. 
(Campaign, 1996) However, the best-known freedom of information is probably the 
US law of 1966 that has been used to expose political scandals, throw light on the 
administrative process, and also provide corporations with valuable business 
intelligence held in government files. Freedom of information laws cut against both 
the secretiveness of those in power and the laxity of record keeping in official bodies. 
The UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not come into force until January 
2005 because the process of bringing record keeping and pro-active disclosure up to 
standards capable of providing the information that enquirers might require was 
considered so big a task that implementation could only follow a lengthy delay. The 
current state of right to information legislation throughout the world varies greatly, as 
a survey of the legislation worldwide reveals (Mendel, 2003). Where they do exist, 
these laws contribute a central structure for the operation of transparency. Yet they are 
far from guaranteeing it unaided, and what is more, they are frequently hampered by 
over generous exemptions allowing administrators and politicians to avoid 
inconvenient revelations. Daruwala (2003) illustrates aspects of the way that these 
laws are implemented in practice in the (British) Commonwealth countries, and the 
difficulties involved do emerge from this. 
 
The courage of individuals who are prepared to reveal information that they may be 
contracted or otherwise obliged to keep confidential is an indispensable complement 
to formal structures for freedom of information. These are the so-called 
whistleblowers (Calland and Dehn, 2004). Just one recent example from the many 
available is that of Katharine Gun, a translator at the British GCHQ security centre. At 
the beginning of 2003 she revealed a plan by US National Security Agency officials 
to involve Britain in using surveillance devices against diplomats of various countries 
who could influence United Nations Security Council decisions on the invasion of 
Iraq. (Burkeman and Norton-Taylor, 2004) She was charged with infringing the UK 
Official Secrets Act and it was not until a year later that the case against her was 
dropped. In fact British law does contain one of the world’s stronger measures to 
protect the disclosure of confidential information in the broader public interest. This is 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998, but it does not apply to prosecutions under 
the Officials Secrets Act. Despite this, Katherine Gun’s defence that her conscience 
required her to make the revelation was entirely in the spirit of this Act, and the 
dropping of the case implicitly recognised the justice of this claim. Thus in an indirect 
way the case shows the significance of public interest disclosure legislation. 
 
From another direction, transparent financial reporting is also essential. The whole 
business structure that depends on limited liability companies trades the protection of 
the personal finances of investors in a company, on the one hand, for full, prompt and 
accurate public accounting, on the other. A series of recent scandals, of which the 
name Enron has become emblematic, shows the extent to which this system struggles 
to deliver. (Johnson, 2004) Governments likewise have an obligation to both their 
international creditors and their own citizens to present accurate and honest budget 
information. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has laid down principles of 
government fiscal transparency that include: full and timely information on past, 
current and projected fiscal activity; the policy objectives of the budget and their 
policy basis; classification of budget data to permit analysis; and the subjecting of 
fiscal information to independent public scrutiny. (Alt, 2002) The role of good record-
keeping in both business and public financial accountability is also apparent. A recent 
report of a Zimbabwean Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee gallantly drew 
attention to the way in which poor accounting and data capture contributes to the 
inability of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to manage public 
finances. The subtext of this was, of course, the way in which this facilitated 
corruption and the misappropriation of funds. (Tsiko, 2004) 
 
A free and independent press is essential as a means of bringing to public notice what 
is revealed by these and other mechanisms. Investigative journalism feeds on what is 
revealed by open government and laws that facilitate access to information, but 
ideally it takes matters a step further. (Waisbord, 2001) There is generally an element 
of detective work when journalists seek to reveal wrongdoing that affects the public 
interest and methods that in themselves are ethically questionable (deceptive 
interviewing techniques or the used of concealed recorders and cameras) are often 
used. Unfortunately press pursuit of sleaze, defined as ‘The way some politicians have 
used their power to feed their private desires for money or sexual satisfaction’ 
(Basten, 2000) has reached frenzied levels in some countries. This threatens to 
undermine the press’s important contribution to transparency, as influential sectors of 
public opinion begin to perceive this as edging over into abuse of legitimate personal 
privacy, particularly when it involves those outside political life. (Travis, 2004) The 
concentration of press ownership to a small number of owners (most notoriously 
Silvio Berlusconi, the prime minister of Italy) also raises doubts about press 
impartiality. Despite this, the press remains a crucial instrument of transparency. 
 
The last element we will discuss here is the role of campaigning civil society 
organisations. In a sobering warning, Johnston (1997, p.82) points out that: 
 
Transparent procedures mean little if there is no external monitoring: corrupt 
states abound in inspectors, commissions of enquiry, and record keeping 
requirements that create and conceal corruption rather than reveal it, because 
no one outside the state can demand a meaningful accounting. Without a 
strong civil society to energise them, even a full set of formally democratic 
institutions will not produce accountable, responsive government. 
 
The point is well made. All of the elements outlined above, and all the others that 
would be discussed in a fuller discussion of transparency, are vulnerable and in need 
of the support that a whole integrity system can offer. The whistleblower, the most 
vulnerable of all, needs the press to report the wrongdoing that is exposed, civil 
society organisations to provide shelter, legal advice, moral support and logistical 
backup, laws that recognise the concept of the public interest, responsive institutions 
and all the paraphernalia of open government to justify disclosure. International and 
national NGOs are often the moving force behind changes in the system and 
instigators or supporters of challenges to corruption of all types in high places or low. 
 
 
A ROLE FOR ICT 
 
The implications of transparency for information professionals, defined as widely as 
possible - records managers, archivists, information officers, computer systems 
managers, librarians, writers, journalists, publishers and editors – have been hinted at 
already. Those who deal with official documentation are professional beneficiaries of 
the demand for more intensive and effective management of records to serve the 
demands of freedom of information legislation. They also bear some of the most 
obvious burdens of responsibility. McKemmish and Acland (1999) show very clearly 
the way in which failures in public accountability and in record keeping typically go 
hand in hand. Information professionals might easily feel both threatened and 
stimulated by the challenges that their role in the creation of transparency offers. The 
stimulus frequently takes the form of a sense that ICT systems offer exceptionally 
appropriate facilities by which transparency can be offered direct and in particularly 
immediate forms to the public for whom it is ultimately intended. There is little point 
in rehearsing at great length just how appropriate computerised systems are for the 
capture, storage, organisation, display and presentation of information. Nor is it hard 
to imagine the ways in which communication technology (radio, TV, the Internet and 
related systems) can deliver this information swiftly and accurately to the most widely 
distributed recipients.  
 
What is interesting is the notion that ICT may possibly offer some answers especially 
appropriate to the problem of the petty corruption of officialdom and the way that it 
bears particularly heavily on the poor. At first this may seem a ridiculous suggestion. 
Poverty is precisely the reason why the poor are classed as falling within the category 
of the information-have-nots when access to ICT is considered. Computer ownership 
might well be the norm in a majority of homes in the industrialised countries, but 
those homes that do not have it are mainly those of a poorer underclass. When we turn 
to the less developed countries, access to ICT in the home is the privilege of a 
minority measured in single percentages points, and access at work or public 
institutions is not a great deal more common. Yet the urgency of the problem is also 
greater. As Gopakumar (2001) puts it: 
 
Information barriers and asymmetry are often quoted as major contributing 
factors to the widespread prevalence of systemic corruption. The situation is 
acute in the interface between monopoly services provided by the government 
and service recipients (citizens). Where exit options do not exist, ‘voice’ 
mechanisms become the only viable and potent avenue to facilitate better 
response and demand more accountability. 
 
Faced with this level of extreme need, it would be foolish to neglect all the things that 
make ICT a uniquely agile means of providing of information. Records can be 
managed most effectively using computers, databases of information for the citizen 
can be updated in real time, information can be read simultaneously at many separate 
locations and it can be delivered onscreen, in print, speech simulation and other 
formats.  
 
If the will to create transparency is there in reforming governments or campaigning 
NGOs, there may be ways to overcome the most obvious of the difficulties. Public 
institutions and corporations in the developing world are already informatised to 
substantial degrees, meaning that the databases that can be used as a basis for 
transparency may often be in existence. At the same time an ICT centre movement is 
bringing access, admittedly on an experimental basis, to disadvantaged communities 
in a number of developing countries. (Caspary, G. and O’Connor, D., 2003) Ways of 
linking these two trends need to be explored, but this does not necessarily need to take 
high tech forms. For instance, comparatively simple response systems such as toll free 
telephone lines can be installed to link public enquiry centres to sources of computer-
held information. Examples of such systems in practice can be found in the Indian 
state of Kerala. (Kumar, 2002)  Electronic citizens’ databases have been created in 
institutions such as the Public Distribution Service, which is responsible for the 
rationing of essential supplies to the poor. Electronic information kiosks in villages 
provide networked access to official electronic services. These initiatives and many 
more form part of a major e-government initiative which uses free software as far as 
possible, seeks to standardise systems between government departments and agencies, 
and is developing data warehousing facilities. Kerala’s example is particularly 
valuable because it presents a particularly clear vision of a role for ICT in the efficient 
delivery of public services and, by extension, the struggle against corruption. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The potential of ICT for transparent delivery of public services and a consequent 
limitation of the scope for corruption exists. The challenge is to take the ideas and 
comparatively tentative beginnings into countries with a variety of different 
circumstances and find ways of inserting them effectively into corrupt and hostile, or 
merely indifferent and apathetic, service provision environments. This is precisely 
what a project, with which the author is involved as academic consultant, seeks to do. 
It is funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) from 
January 2004 to June 2005 and has sub-projects in India, Pakistan, Croatia and 
Nigeria. Each sub-project is addressing a different problem (in India, access to the 
facilities of an underused public maternity hospital; in Pakistan, the provision of an e-
complaint centre for a local government unit; in Croatia, information on waiting lists 
for hospitals and nursing homes; and in Nigeria information on school places in a 
region with very low take up of schooling). Each is also being addressed by a 
different combination of ICT facilities. The outcome is expected to contribute to the 
development of generally applicable principles for using ICT to provide specifically 
pro-poor transparency. There is a great deal to be done before the approach can be 
regarded as solidly established and there is a dangerous paradox at the heart of it. The 
progress of transparency is dependent on political will and the strength of civil society 
in countries where corruption is very deeply rooted as a response to the problems of 
survival and progress. Nevertheless societies do change and the direction of change 
can be for the better if the conviction is there and the methods to bring about change 
are sufficiently known.   
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